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The Future Internet offers increasing opportunities for participation by private individuals, natural 
persons in legal terms1. Personal access devices have not been confined to office-based personal 
computers for some time, and continue to evolve: computer systems grew smaller and more 
compact with a demand for increased portability, and personal communication devices (mobile 
phones) grew in storage and processing capacity as well as going beyond telecommunications to the 
web (smart phones) for the two to converge in tablet-type devices. On the one hand, this allows for 
extensive and pervasive connectivity all day, every day, for access to data and information systems, 
to communicate with friends, with colleagues and with businesses and government, as well as to 
share with the world or worlds what us going for the individual or in an individual’s reaction to 
events or to others: the social network. On the other, this poses increasing challenges for personal 
privacy as well as freedom. Personal data associated with individuals should be treated with care, it 
can be assumed; but what happens when the data subjects themselves release such data via social 
networking sites (SNS)? 
 
In this report, relevant legislation surrounding the treatment of personal data is presented and 
reviewed. Interactions of individuals (data subjects) with online services is described against the 
legislative background and summary conclusions and recommendations are made directed at FI 
Users, FI Providers and Service and application developers. The report is divided into the following 
sections: 
 
Background: the legal perspective on protecting personal data outlines the legal framework in 
Europe for the protection of personal data, summarising the various sections of the Data 
Protection Directive for how such data should be handled. 
The reality: should we be nervous? discusses how legislation is implemented and lists areas 
such as unauthorised disclosure and sharing in terms of particular cases against well-known 
service providers. 
User perceptions: trust briefly reviews user attitudes to online services and how their personal 
data are protected. 
User confidence: the public domain outlines the legal basis for treating data which have been 
made public (such as varying sharing on public websites); and finally 
User profiles and data mining: derivative works looks how personal data shared via social 
networking sites along with records of online activity and behaviours can be used to build up 
profiles of end users which could well provide an unwanted perspective on a given individual. 
 
So the intention in this overview is to bring together legislative, subjective and service-oriented 
aspects of personal data usage as it stands today with some indicators of the challenges for those 
building as well as using the Future Internet. 
                                                     
1 A living person as is commonly understood; the yet unborn and dead are not afforded the same legal status. 
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Background: the legal perspective2 on protecting personal data 
 
Issue 
The FI offers unprecedented access to data sources, with smart devices 
and sensors able to collect information dynamically to be transferred 
on for aggregation and interrogation as well as services and 
applications dedicated to interactions between users and whole 
communities both locally and across whole regions and continents. In 
such an environment, the issue of personal data – not just personal 
identifiers such as name, address and so forth, but also location, online 
activity and behaviours – becomes increasingly relevant. How the data 
should be dealt with must first consider existing legislation and its 
implications for service developers, infrastructure providers and of 
course end users themselves. 
 
The Data Protection Directive (DPD)3 establishes a framework which aims to protect the 
“fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with 
respect to the processing of personal data”[our italics]. Under Article 2(a) the concept of “personal 
data” is defined as  
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”. 
The processing of such personal data is a major focus of the DPD and is described at Article 2(b) as 
“any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by 
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction”. 
This is particularly relevant to all FI ecosystem stakeholders, and especially to the service and 
application developers and providers, as well as the infrastructure owners who provide the resource 
to run those services and applications.  
With a relational framework established between data subject (as defined above), data controller 
(the person or organisation deciding how and why data should be processed) and the data processor 
(the person or organisation actually carrying out any such processing), the DPD stipulates particular 
principles that must be adhered to when data are being processed, as found under Article 6, and 
require that personal data must be: 
(i) “processed fairly and lawfully; 
(ii) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way 
incompatible with those purposes […]; 
                                                     
2 Throughout this document, and for the purposes of simplicity, we have concentrated principally on EU law, 
or that of its member states. 
3
 Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (1995) OJ L 281/31 
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(iii) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected 
and/or further processed; 
(iv) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to 
ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for 
which they were collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified; 
(v) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary 
for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed 
[…]”. 
And it is on those terms that consent should usually be sought: the data subject needs to know what 
the data will be used for, and have a right to access the data to check validity and currency. 
At the EU level, the data protection framework provided for in the DPD does not distinguish 
between personal data that is in the public domain until that data falls under Article 8 as “special 
categories of data”.  
Article 8(1) establishes that no processing of personal data which reveals “racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership” shall occur and nor 
shall “processing of data concerning health or sex life”. This statement is then subject to certain 
exclusions listed in Article 8(2) as 
“(a) the data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing of those data […]; or 
(b) processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific rights 
of the controller in the field of employment law in so far as it is authorized by national law 
providing for adequate safeguards; or 
(c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another 
person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving his consent; or 
(d) processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate 
guarantees by a foundation, association or any other non-profit-seeking body with a 
political, philosophical, religious or trade-union aim and on condition that the processing 
relates solely to the members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in 
connection with its purposes and that the data are not disclosed to a third party without the 
consent of the data subjects; or 
(e) the processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by the data subject or is 
necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.” [our italics] 
This is the only part of the Directive which distinguishes between data not in the public domain and 
data which is. There is no explicit EU law on what “manifestly made public by the data subject” 
means, but it is generally understood as requiring “a deliberate act by the data subject, disclosing 
the data to the public”. For example, therefore, video surveillance would not be considered 
appropriate, but an interview to media, or publication on a public internet page would make data 
public.4 
                                                     
4 Kotschy in Alfred Büllesbach et. al., Concise European IT Law, (2010, 2nd Edn, Kluwer Law International) 62 
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Following the absence of discussion regarding public domain throughout the rest of the Directive, it 
is clear that where personal data exists in the public domain and is subsequently processed,  this 
processing is still subject to the Directive’s principles and requirements.  
Indeed, if one looks to the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), they noted in their online 
code of practice5 that: 
 “People may post their personal details in such a way that they become publicly visible – for 
example through a social networking or recruitment site. Wherever the personal data 
originates, you still have an overarching duty to handle it fairly and to comply with the rules 
of data protection[…] 
 If you collect information from the internet and use it in a way that’s unfair or breaches the 
other data protection principles, you could still be subject to enforcement action under the 
DPA even though the information was obtained from a publicly available source.  
 It is good practice to only use publicly available information in a way that is unlikely to cause 
embarrassment, distress or anxiety to the individual concerned. You should only use their 
information in a way they are likely to expect and to be comfortable with. If in doubt about 
this, and you are unable to ask permission, you should not collect their information in the 
ﬁrst place.” [our italics] 
Thus, if personal data is being processed that was collected from the public domain it must adhere 
to the data protection principles6 (see (i) to (v) above). In essence, therefore, the final point of the 
ICO guidance is most important. The use must be “unlikely to cause embarrassment, distress or 
anxiety to the individual concerned” and a use of “their information in a way they are likely to 
expect and to be comfortable with”. This guidance implies an element of consent is granted through 
a data subject making that data publicly available, making the processing “lawful”, and the controller 
must then ensure that the use does not cause embarrassment, distress or anxiety which meets the 
“fairness” requirement.  
So nominally, FI users/participants should be adequately protected from embarrassment and the 
misuse of their data, not least since the natural or legal person7 responsible for controlling and 
processing any data collected by a device and then manipulated in any specific way must gain 
consent and may only use the data for an appropriate and identified purpose. Any additional 
processing is subject to strict control and possibly legal sanction. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
                                                     
5
 UK ICO, ‘Personal information online code of practice’ (July 2010) 
<http://www.ico.org.uk/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Detailed_specialist_guides/personal_inf
ormation_online_cop.pdf> accessed 15
th
 July 2013. 
6
 DPD (n3) Article 6(1). 
7
 By contrast to a natural person, a legal person is an entity that has acquired the status of a person through 
law. This is useful for example as it enables companies to enter into contracts. In a business to consumer 
contract, the business will be a legal person 
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Users 
There is sufficient legislation in place to protect personal data. Data collection 
should be with consent, appropriate to the intended processing, and 
protected from inaccuracy as well as disclosure8. 
Providers 
The Data Protection Framework would class application and service providers 
either as data controllers or data processors. Either way, they are expected to 
act according to their responsibilities in respect of personal data. Specifically, 
they should seek consent from the data subjects, as well as retain and 
processed data only within the limits of the original purpose. 
FI Service 
and 
Application 
Developers 
1) Be clear on your rôle as data processor or controller; and make users 
aware  
2) Ensure explicit consent is requested for any data processing undertaken 
3) Treat any consent forms in much the same way as a provider might 
manage SLAs: there should be dynamic compliance checking to the terms 
agreed to under data subject consent as an integral part of the execution 
of the application or service you run. 
 
The reality: should we be nervous? 
 
Issue 
Within an FI ecosystem of competing requirements and drivers, the 
question is whether the legislation is adequate and whether indeed the 
authorities are willing to prosecute transgression. What is more, is it 
enough to expect users to agree to long-winded and complicated terms 
and policies thereby relieving developers and providers of the burden 
of appropriate data handling?  
 
The most recent case for Google sees end users under siege again: those who correspond with Gmail 
users should “have no expectation of privacy”9. The end user licence agreement (EULA) presented to 
Gmail account holders bounds their own rights to privacy in what they send out. Invoking the “third 
party doctrine” for non-Gmail users, though, really should be challenged10, not least on the basis 
that Google’s intrusions are so extensive that implied consent is probably not enough.  
 
However, there is a precedent for challenging such terms in the courts, even for Gmail users 
themselves (see below and the probation imposed on Twitter). Notwithstanding specific differences 
across different jurisdictions, there is generally sufficient protection for individuals. Beyond the legal 
background, though, most providers will request some kind of consent via a licence. This 
presupposes that users look at the terms and conditions and the privacy policies of the particular 
service they wish to use. For common utilities11, their terms and policies may be summarised as 
follows: 
                                                     
8
 Although legislation does exist to protect user data, it is far from unusual for providers to fall foul of such 
legislation. 
9
 http://techland.time.com/2013/08/14/google-says-gmail-users-have-no-legitimate-expectation-of-privacy/ 
10
 http://www.theverge.com/2013/8/14/4621474/yes-gmail-users-have-an-expectation-of-privacy  
11
 We looked at Amazon Web Services, Doodle, Dropbox, Evernote, Google, GoToMeeting, Podio, Prezi, Scribd, 
SkyDrive, Skype, SlideShare. 
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(a) None of them claimed ownership over content submitted to their services, but all required 
some form of licence to be granted.  
(b) None of the tools or utilities impose terms which are particularly different to the others; 
however Google is arguably granted the most wide reaching rights through requiring rights 
to be granted to allow not only for operation as do other providers, but also for promotion, 
improvement and development. 
(c) Some tools and utilities do not explicitly state which rights are granted and under what type 
of licence; most notably Dropbox and Evernote. This is possibly due to them wanting their 
terms to be seen as “user friendly” and absent of legalese12.  
(d) Generally speaking data deletion is up to the users: users should manually delete all data 
from the service/platform before cancelling. Users must also be aware of what data they 
share since this may still exist after cancellation of accounts.  
(e) Whichever utility or tool is used, users are often required to check terms and policy changes 
regularly, since some providers will not alert them to any such changes.  
 
Apart from (b), these terms in connection with the consent requested, it would seem reasonable to 
expect that data are therefore protected. This is not always the case, though. A 2012 study13 
revealed some disconcerting cases of a number of different service and application providers: 
 
 
UNAUTHORISED DATA COLLECTION 
Apple It was found that iPhones had secret files tracking location without the 
owner’s permission or indeed knowledge14. They denied any wrong-doing, 
insisting that this was for legitimate purposes to help identify subsets of 
locations within larger databases to benefit the individual user. They 
promised to encrypt the data and reduce time spent on the device in the 
future. 
Carrier IQ15 In 2011, Carrier IQ was found collecting data related to usage and so forth 
without subscribers’ knowledge nor their ability to opt out. 
Google During the collection of Street View images, the mobile camera cars 
“inadvertently” picked up data from unsecured wireless networks for some 
four years. Google claimed that this was an isolated occurrence involving a 
single engineer acting with company authorisation. This was contested and 
the Federal Communications Commission fined them some $25,000 and 
complained that Google obstructed investigations. 
Intel In 1999, Intel had to disable a feature on the Pentium III chip after public 
outcry over what was suspected to be a “super cookie” that could effectively 
track the user’s surfing activities indefinitely. 
Path The photo sharing app, Path16, was found to be uploading address books 
                                                     
12
 This arguably leaves some ambiguity that may be detrimental to the user. 
13
 http://news.cnet.com/2300-1023_3-10012162.html 
14
 news.cnet.com/”http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-20055885-37.html 
15
 http://www.carrieriq.com/ 
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from subscribers’ devices without permission. 
UNAUTHORISED SHARING 
AOL 1998: a customer service agent released personal information about a 
subscriber to the Navy about his sexual orientation which led to his 
discharge from the forces. 
2006: the company published the search history of more than 650,000 
users. Even though “anonymised”, the specific search history of individuals 
could still be tracked. 
facebook In 2011, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) claimed that facebook were 
not even complying with its own rules on data sharing and access, promising 
to take appropriate steps in future to make things more transparent for 
subscribers17 
Twitter Also in 2011, Twitter were put on probation for 20 years by the FTC and 
forbidden for:  
“misleading consumers about the extent to which it protects the 
security, privacy, and confidentiality of nonpublic consumer 
information, including the measures it takes to prevent 
unauthorized access to nonpublic information and honor the privacy 
choices made by consumers.” (op cit) 
UNEXPECTED VULNERABILITY 
Microsoft In 1999, Microsoft had to black out Hotmail for some 12 hours after 
discovering that subscriber accounts could be accessed by anyone with a 
web browser. 
Sony Protection software (a “rootkit”) to avoid illegal copying installed itself when 
a CD was played, which rendered the machine vulnerable to malware. 
(2005) 
UNEXPECTED SHARING 
Yahoo! Yahoo! co-operated with the Chinese authority and released IDs of political 
dissidents who were subsequently imprisoned. 
 
 
All of these cases, with the possible exception of Yahoo!, should be covered by the appropriate 
legislation: the data subjects should know what data are being collected, how they are being used, 
and who has access to them. Clearly, the terms and policies of providers cannot necessarily be taken 
as the final arbiter in such cases: both Twitter and facebook have been prosecuted for misleading 
terms or even failing to comply with their own terms. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Users 
Users need to review and maintain currency with the terms and conditions 
and privacy policies of the providers whose services they depend on.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
16
 http://www.path.com 
17
 http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm 
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Providers 
Despite their terms and conditions, providers have been successfully 
prosecuted for a number of different failings, including unauthorised 
collection, use and disclosure of personal data, even deliberately over-
complicating the terms of service they impose. 
FI Service 
and 
Application 
Developers 
1) Services should use specific terms and conditions appropriate to their 
purpose; terms should be simple to understand; users should be 
alerted to changes and what that means to them 
2) Services should not involve hidden data collection 
3) Services should not disclose or share data without explicit consent. 
User perceptions: trust 
 
Issue 
For the FI to deliver on the promise of economic growth and expansion, 
as well as online activity to become the norm and available to all, there 
is a significant and fundamental question: will the end-users, the 
consumers of the services driving the Digital Agenda’s virtuous cycle, be 
prepared to embrace the new technologies and engage whole-
heartedly in that context? For the FI to succeed, users must trust that 
they will be dealt with appropriately. 
 
 
So, there is legal protection under the Data Protection Directive and clear legal precedent that data 
misuse, as well as obviously misleading terms, will be challenged. That being said, the question is 
whether or not individuals do actually feel they can trust the services they depend on. The 2012 
results18 for the annual survey of some ten thousand adults into how they rate organisations in 
terms of their “[commitment] to protecting the privacy of their personal information” reveals some 
interesting trends. In summary, and ignoring what organisations were mentioned and indicators of 
rankings between them, the following results may be cited: 
 
Attitudes to privacy 
 78% of respondents continue to see the protection 
of their personal information as instrumental in 
building and maintaining trust19. 
 Important measures related to trust: 
o 73% : security over personal information 
o 59% : no data sharing without consent 
o 59% : the ability to be forgotten [sic] 
o 55% : the right to revoke consent. 
 49% reported receiving one or more data breach 
notifications within the previous two years, of 
whom 70% said it reduced their level of trust. 
Most trusted sectors 
From 25 categories, healthcare, consumer products and 
banking are the most trusted in terms of privacy; 
Internet and social media, charities and toys are the 
                                                     
18
 http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2012%20MTC%20Report%20FINAL.pdf 
19
 Nevertheless, 63% admit sharing sensitive personal information with organisations they didn’t know or trust, 
of whom 60% justified it on the basis of convenience (i.e. making a purchase). 
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least trusted. 
Effects of technology 
 59% believe privacy rights undermined by 
disruptive technologies (social media, smart mobile 
devices, geo-tracking tools) 
 55% claim that privacy has been diminished 
because of government intrusions 
User control 
 35% believe they maintain control of their own 
information. This figure has been going down for 
some seven years. 
 61% (the highest) believe identity is the main 
concern related to privacy, while 
 56% cite an increase in government surveillance. 
View of policies 
32% do not rely on policies when making trust 
judgements, of whom 60% claim the policies are too 
long or contain too much legalese. 
 
Irrespective of individual conclusions, perhaps the most interesting results in the present context 
suggest that social media and the Internet in particular lack trust. This clearly does not stop 
subscribers using them20, even though long-term engagement via SNS can be significantly less 
satisfying than direct social interaction21; nor institutions and agencies forcing contact online22. 
Looking further, though, it is interesting to note: 
 
1) Users are concerned about a loss of control, and yet the DPD and the explicit requirement 
for consent associated with specific data handling, should provide such control; and 
2) Users bemoan government intrusion23. However, this is treated as an exception in the 
DPD24,25. 
 
Dutton and his colleagues have noted that Internet users with increasing experience and familiarity 
develop appropriate trust levels online, and decide for themselves what they can and should not do: 
that is, irrespective of the regulatory framework, experienced users will make their own decisions 
                                                     
20
 The current top three include facebook (1,000M subscribers), Twitter (500M) and Google+ (500M). See 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57525797-93/facebook-hits-1-billion-active-user-milestone/; and also 
http://news.discovery.com/tech/apps/top-ten-social-networking-sites.htm on site popularity, and 
http://social-networking-websites-review.toptenreviews.com/ on site rankings, including interestingly 
“security”. 
21 http://uk.news.yahoo.com/facebook-social-network-linked-unhappiness-215939039.html#m6L7M0L 
22
 Such as the US immigration authority (http://travel.state.gov/visa/forms/forms_1342.html) ; the Digital 
Agenda for Europe is also seeking to encourage online participation (http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/scoreboard, and especially Pillars IV, VI and VII). 
23
 See recent discussion about NSA (eg http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/25/justice-department-
case-nsa-collection) and the case of Prism (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23051248) 
24
 Article 13, for instance, provides for member states to circumvent requirements on data privacy on the basis 
of national security i.a. 
25
 The disclosure of Yahoo! cited earlier was generally frowned upon in the US courts, yet highlights some level 
of ambiguity in government position on “surveillance” and overriding basic privacy rights. This was also seen in 
government attitudes to the Arab Spring versus the London Riots motivated by police shooting of Mark 
Duggan. 
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and judgements26. It is nonetheless true that users are, and should be, nervous about information 
being collected about them, especially now that the various technologies and services they use 
readily allow data to be collected and analysed27. The SESERV project (http://www.seserv.org) 
concluded with a specific recommendation on this point: service and application providers as well as 
government and other agencies should not “let the ease of collecting user data be done to such an 
extent as to let the user feel under surveillance or threat (or more simply put off)”28. The problem is 
exacerbated though by the fact that the data which are collected are not necessarily just personal 
information covered by the DPD: they may also include online activity (searches and so forth) which 
can easily be cross-correlated with the personal data available through SNS29. 
 
Finally, in this section, consider the provision of the DPD on retaining data. Article 6, section (iv) talks 
about data being kept “up to date” and goes on to stipulate that inaccurate or incomplete data 
should be erased or rectified (see above). From a user perspective, it would be tempting to assume 
that this actually means that as the data subjects they have the right to remove those data when 
they no longer want them30. However, as an Austrian student discovered, this is not necessarily the 
case, with facebook retaining all his personal data even those he thought he had deleted. This led to 
a request under the Freedom of Information act which revealed the extent of the problem31. 
 
Users do remain uncomfortable about privacy and the protection of their personal data, therefore. 
In particular, the capabilities of disruptive technologies (smart phones, SNS, etc.) as well as 
government surveillance rate high on the list of concerns. Despite legislation which outlines 
appropriate use and attempts to limit processing, as well as clear indications of a will to prosecute 
where necessary, users still complain of a loss of control and concerns over intrusion. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Users 
Users need to monitor their own use of sites and services if they feel under 
threat. Provision is made for protection of their private information, but they 
should be vigilant themselves. 
Providers 
Care needs to be taken to avoid a perception of snooping. Increased 
transparency about data handling would help build and maintain trust 
among users. Government agencies should be particularly mindful of user 
concerns. 
FI Service 
and 
Application 
Developers 
1) Make it easy for users to view their personal data, modify them and/or 
remove them; 
2) Make sure that any such activity is applied across all data you hold; 
3) Allow users to view before and after “states” (i.e. to alleviate fears of 
surveillance) 
 
                                                     
26
 Dutton, W.H. and Shepherd, A. (2003) “Trust in the Internet: The Social Dynamics of Experience 
Technology”, The Oxford Internet Institute, available from: 
http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/resources/publications/RR3.pdf 
27
 See the summary results from the Ponemon survey above. 
28
 Recommendation 9 http://www.scribd.com/doc/105908010/D3-1-2-v2-pdf 
29
 Krishnamurthy, B. and C.Wills (2010) On the Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information Via Online Social 
Networks. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Volume 40, Number 1, pp. 112 – 117. 
30
 See also the “ability to be forgotten” in the Ponemon trust survey. 
31
 http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/en.html  
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User confidence: the public domain 
 
Issue 
One of the major new technologies to emerge late in the 90s but 
increasingly in the first decade of this millennium is social media. End 
users are now able to interact with others – family, friends, associates, 
people with similar experiences and interests – via the Internet. Lives 
are increasingly lived out in part at least through social networks with 
tweets for example keeping anyone and everyone abreast of what is 
happening to, for and with anyone else. Constant sharing of personal 
experience in this way begs the question of whether such information 
and data should not be treated as public property the processing of 
which does not require regulation. When is my personal data no longer 
my property? 
 
The SESERV recommendation referred to previously continues with: 
 
“[…] citizens have a responsibility to careful about what information they share online, and 
regulators need to educate the public about and enforce data protection laws.”32 
putting a logically founded onus on users to take on their fair share. If there are terms and policies, 
however long-winded and linguistically unfamiliar, they should be read; if users have concerns, they 
should raise them, and ask for disclosure of what is personal to them33. There is, however, another 
angle to this: in disclosing information about myself in an SNS, do I have a right to privacy or is that 
information now public? 
The concept of the “public domain” has been called a “multifaceted and multidimensional concept 
with no definite definition”,34 indeed its remit changes depending on its subject. The concept itself 
may refer to:  
1) public domain in relation to data and information and how this interacts with data 
protection; and  
2) the broad area of intellectual property, which itself has different conceptions of public 
domain depending on the type of IPR.  
In the present context, we will consider (1) above only since we are more concerned with personal 
data and its disclosure than issues around the protection of creativity associated with content 
generated by users. 
European Union Level 
At the EU level, the data protection framework provided for in the DPD does not distinguish 
between personal data that is in the public domain until that data falls under Article 8 as “special 
categories of data”.  
                                                     
32
 Loc cit 
33
 This may not always be straight-forward: going through all terms and policies online may be too time-
consuming, or when wishing to use a service for the first time motivation may be low. 
34
 Tshimanga Kongolo, ‘Intellectual property and misappropriation of the public  domain’ (2011) 33(12) EIPR 
780 
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Article 8(1) establishes that no processing of personal data which reveals “racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership” shall occur and nor 
shall “processing of data concerning health or sex life”. This statement is then subject to certain 
exclusions listed in Article 8(2) as 
“(a) the data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing of those data, except 
where the laws of the Member State provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 
may not be lifted by the data subject's giving his consent; or 
(b) processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific rights 
of the controller in the field of employment law in so far as it is authorized by national law 
providing for adequate safeguards; or 
(c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another 
person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving his consent; or 
(d) processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate 
guarantees by a foundation, association or any other non-profit-seeking body with a 
political, philosophical, religious or trade-union aim and on condition that the processing 
relates solely to the members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in 
connection with its purposes and that the data are not disclosed to a third party without the 
consent of the data subjects; or 
(e) the processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by the data subject or is 
necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.” [our italics] 
This is the only part of the Directive which distinguishes between data not in the public domain and 
data which is. There is no explicit EU law on what “manifestly made public by the data subject” 
means, but it is generally understood as requiring “a deliberate act by the data subject, disclosing 
the data to the public”. For example, therefore, video surveillance would not be considered a 
conscious action to disclose information, but an interview to media, or publication on a public 
internet page would make data public.35 
Following the absence of discussion regarding public domain throughout the rest of the Directive, it 
is clear that where personal data exists in the public domain and is subsequently processed,  this 
processing is still subject to the Directive’s principles and requirements [our emphasis].  
Indeed, if one looks to the UK ICO, they noted in their online code of practice36 that: 
 “People may post their personal details in such a way that they become publicly visible – for 
example through a social networking or recruitment site. Wherever the personal data 
originates, you still have an overarching duty to handle it fairly and to comply with the rules 
of data protection… 
 If you collect information from the internet and use it in a way that’s unfair or breaches the 
other data protection principles, you could still be subject to enforcement action under the 
DPA even though the information was obtained from a publicly available source.  
                                                     
35
 Kotschy in Alfred Büllesbach et. al., Concise European IT Law, (2010, 2nd Edn, Kluwer Law International) 62 
36
 UK ICO, ‘Personal information online code of practice’ (July 2010) 
<http://www.ico.org.uk/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Detailed_specialist_guides/personal_inf
ormation_online_cop.pdf> accessed 15
th
 July 2013. 
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 It is good practice to only use publicly available information in a way that is unlikely to cause 
embarrassment, distress or anxiety to the individual concerned. You should only use their 
information in a way they are likely to expect and to be comfortable with. If in doubt about 
this, and you are unable to ask permission, you should not collect their information in the 
ﬁrst place.” [our italics] 
Thus, if personal data is being processed that was collected from the public domain it must adhere 
to the data protection principles.37 That is the data must be: 
“(a) processed fairly and lawfully; 
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a 
way incompatible with those purposes… 
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected and/or further processed; 
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to 
ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for 
which they were collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified; 
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further 
processed…” 
In essence, therefore, the final point in the UK ICO guidance is most important of the three: that the 
use must be “unlikely to cause embarrassment, distress or anxiety to the individual concerned” and 
a use of “their information in a way they are likely to expect and to be comfortable with”. However, 
that said, all should be taken into account when considering the processing of publicly available 
data. This guidance implies an element of consent is granted through a data subject making that 
data publicly available, making the processing “lawful”, and the controller must then ensure that the 
use does not cause embarrassment, distress or anxiety which meets the “fairness” requirement.  
Individual jurisdictions vary in their interpretation of what constitutes “public domain”, if at all. 
However, from a UK perspective, case law has shown that the determination of “public domain” falls 
to the question of whether the particular information was “’realistically’ accessible to members of 
the public or only ‘in theory’”.38 Further, information would not be in the public domain if it required 
an unrealistic “specialised knowledge and persistence” to find it. So the average member of public 
must be able to find the information fairly easily.39  
 
The legislation in this area is not as clear cut. Nevertheless, and in summary, individuals who take 
steps to publish information in publically accessible areas which requires no significant effort to 
view, then they may be assumed to have released it into the public domain. That being said, there is 
still an obligation on others to process such personal information with care, specifically to avoid 
embarrassment and not in a way that would be unexpected by the individual concerned. 
 
Anecdotal cases of embarrassment caused by making public responses best kept within the close 
circle of family and friends appear with continued regularity, including: 
 
                                                     
37
 DPD Article 6(1). 
38
 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 687 (QB) 
39
 Attorney General v Greater Manchester Newspapers [2001] EWHC QB 451 
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 Political gesturing40 
 Social insensitivity41 
 The long-term effects of past indiscretion42 
 Unexpected consequences  
o of heroic intervention43, or 
o public insensitivity44. 
 
But in all such cases, it could be argued that those posting such content should have had an 
expectation that they were making it public: these were “deliberate act[s] by the data subject, 
disclosing the data to the public”.   
 
There are positives and negatives here. Richard Branson, for instance, the importance of going public 
in this way: 
 
“Embracing social media isn’t just a bit of fun, it is a vital way to communicate, keep your ear 
to the ground and improve your business”45 
 
though this does have a knock on effect. Take employment, for instance:  
 
 prospective candidates are encouraged to avoid specific types of activity (inappropriate 
comments or photos, dishonesty, and so forth)46 
 employers do use sites to screen candidates47 
 facebook is particularly important, it appears48 
 
and so on. Indeed the non-use of social media may be taken as suspicious49 . So online activity is now 
part of individual life and will presumably continue to be so50. This does not, however, mean that all 
personal details posted on such sights can be used arbitrarily, even though they may be regarded as 
in the public domain. Any derivative processing may only be done within the constraints of the DPD, 
and should certainly not cause embarrassment or go beyond what might be expected by the data 
subject themselves. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Users 
There is no reason not to use social media to share content, and indeed it 
may be a necessary or expected part of everyday life. Notwithstanding any 
specific settings or other facilities offered by the site in question, that 
content becomes public domain. Users must take responsibility for what 
they share in this way; authorities (and providers) should really help users 
                                                     
40
 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2082527/Diane-Abbott-Twitter-race-row-MP-faces-calls-resign-
racist-tweet.html 
41
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-essex-23164829 
42
 http://uk.news.yahoo.com/teen-crime-commissioner-offensive-tweet-row-081528626.html#Tzh3SvT  
43
 http://news.sky.com/story/1064049/shark-wrestler-grandad-disgusted-by-sacking 
44
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-coventry-warwickshire-11068063 
45
 http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20121019130632-204068115-why-aren-t-more-business-
leaders-online 
46
 http://blog.reppler.com/2012/06/ 
47
 http://blog.reppler.com/2012/07/ 
48
 http://blog.reppler.com/2012/03/13/can-your-facebook-profile-predict-job-performance/ 
49
 http://blog.reppler.com/2012/08/ 
50
 See also: http://www.seserv.org/Studying-the-Future-Internet/doesyourbosstweet 
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understand the implications of posting content. 
Providers 
Users sharing content and personal information, for instance via a SNS, 
should still be respected under the DPD. Their content and personal 
information should not be shared, disclosed, or otherwise processed if it 
might cause embarrassment or alternatively in a way that the data subject 
could not reasonably have expected. 
FI Service 
and 
Application 
Developers 
1) Alert users to the scope of sharing when they post content and personal 
information (i.e. extend the Are you sure? type warnings to include You 
are now releasing this information to these people). 
2) Restrict access to personal data: 
a. 3rd parties can only view but not copy  
b. APIs should disallow extraction without alert to data subjects 
c. In-house analytics should not be used51. 
 
User profiles and data mining: derivative works 
 
Issue 
With the technologies of the FI making ever more data available and 
end users increasingly willing or required to share personal data online, 
the next major challenge for the FI is the regulation of how such data is 
processed and interrogated to reveal even more about the lives and 
preferences of those online than they themselves might have wanted 
to share. What will the status be if we let the power of data analytics 
loose on data otherwise shared for different purposes? 
 
 
So far in this section, we have considered issues about privacy around personal data, user 
perceptions of how much protection they are given even when they choose themselves to make the 
data public. Finally, we should consider the additional and perhaps more recent issue of how those 
personal data are manipulated to generate a derivative set of “meta data”. As highlighted 
previously, it is not difficult to match online activity with personal details29 and thereby potentially 
gain access to much more information than the data subject might have intended or expected. 
Irrespective of individual consent, there are two particular problems here: 
 
1) In consenting to the limited use of personal data in different contexts, albeit in some cases 
embedded with the terms and policies of individual platforms, the user may not have 
intended the data to appear or be used together;  
2) And more worryingly, data mining may be used to infer things which are not in fact true, or 
certainly would not have been released to anyone by the individual data subject. 
 
In the first case, the data subject retains some level of control: they are still able to give or refuse 
consent for certain types of information or personal data. Even so, there is little protect against the 
                                                     
51
 Further processing in this way may well go beyond reasonable and expected additional processing, and as 
such may well go against the original terms of the consent provided. More important and potentially 
disturbing, though, is that further analyses may reveal hidden or unknown characteristics of users which they 
would certainly never have agreed to release. 
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possibility of jigsaw attacks52 where a so-called motivated intruder might use legitimately available 
data sources and match one against the other. There is nothing that can be done against this, unless 
previously collected personal data have been successfully anonymised prior to release and in order 
to reduce the possibility of other datasets being linked to it. 
 
The second case is perhaps more disturbing. Take the case of a retailer who simply through the 
analysis of sales established who may or may not be pregnant and targeted marketing material at 
those customers. When one of them turned out to be a teenage girl who had not yet decided to tell 
her family of her pregnancy, the whole family suffered53. There is nothing really in the legislation to 
protect against this, assuming she had released her name and address during her purchasing and 
had agreed to the information being used for marketing purposes, a fairly common request 
especially for online services and retailers. 
 
The basic business model of SNS relies on precisely this kind of analysis: using the personal data that 
subscribers provide, along with monitoring their activities – their Likes and Dislikes, who they 
interact with, and the topics that motivate their participation – the site can provide targeted 
marketing and charge premium rates to do so. It is one thing to be irritated by such marketing, but 
quite another to discover prospective employers or even government agencies, such as the police 
and intelligence services, can do the same sort of analysis if they so desire. Innocent information 
from photos, for instance, including not only the subscriber or other members of the social 
networking site but also other people, could be used to identify the movements of individuals who 
had never provider consent in the sites end-user licence agreement. As such, data mining in this way 
could have a very serious and detrimental effect. On the one hand, it could reveal information that 
the individual would never have disclosed of their own volition. More disturbingly, if the analysis is 
incorrect, it will reveal information about an individual which isn’t even correct54,55.  
 
In some sense, the creation of additional metadata about an individual is legitimate, if ethically 
questionable: analysis could be covered under a usage agreement. In addition, the personal data 
used could be said to be in the public domain as previously discussed. However, and as outlined in 
the DPD, due care has to be exercised where embarrassment might result, and where the user 
would not have expected such additional analyses to take place. Significantly, though, perhaps it 
could be argued that information about pregnancy, sexual orientation or health which have clearly 
emerged and been disclosed in this way come under the category sensitive data and therefore may 
not be released without the explicit consent associated with them from the data subject.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Users The encouragement to be careful about what individuals reveal about 
                                                     
52
 See 
http://www.ico.org.uk/~/media/documents/library/Corporate/Research_and_reports/anonymisation_cop_dr
aft_consultation.ashx and 
https://www.ico.org.uk/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Practical_application/anonymisation_co
de.ashx 
53
 Kashmir Hill, 2012. “How Target figured out a teen girl was pregnant before her father did,” Forbes (16 
February), at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-
pregnant-before-her-father-did/, cited in Obler, Welsh and Cruz “The danger of big data: Social media as 
computational social science” http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3993/3269  
54
 Current accuracy rates may be no better than 70% 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/jun/10/social-media-analytics-sentiment-analysis 
55
 http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2013/5/163753-discrimination-in-online-ad-delivery/fulltext provides a 
disturbing example of the use of derivative analyses. 
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themselves is more acute when we consider: 
i. Data from different sources may be able to be cross-matched and 
reveal more about the users than they originally and separately 
intended; 
ii. Metadata can be derived from personal data along with online 
activity that may reveal information about the user that may cause 
embarrassment or worse, whether or not it is correct. 
There is also no clear legal protection against this. 
Providers 
Irrespective of consent and usage licences, providers have an ethical 
obligation to be sensitive about the data they derive from an original source. 
Care should be taken to protect the individual even in the face of market 
pressures. 
FI Service 
and 
Application 
Developers 
1) Despite the lack of clarity on the legal status of derived metadata, care 
should be taken if those data could be construed as sensitive data. 
2) Disclosure of personal data even with consent should be done on a case-
by-case basis and in consideration of the possibility of jigsaw attacks. 
3) Users should be allowed to review and modify any derived metadata as 
part of the administrative components of any ongoing service or 
application.  
 
 
